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Loan syndication is a major segment of the wholesale business of commercial banks in the 
United States (US).
1 With more than two trillion dollars in commitment volume outstanding, 
the syndicated loan market is an increasingly important source of financing for corporations. 
Typically,  a  loan  syndicate  is  formed  by  a  mandated  arranger,  who  is  appointed  by  the 
borrower to bring together a group of institutional investors and banks that are prepared to 
lend money on specific terms to the borrower.  
 
The reputation of the lead bank can be seen as a certification of the quality of the loan being 
syndicated.
2 The role of underwriter reputation is known to have large price consequences for 
bond  issuers,  especially  for  those  underwriting  below-investment  grade  bonds  (see,  for 
example, Fang, 2005).
3  Top tier underwriters offer better terms to their best clients in order 
to certify to the market a quality assurance on the issues they underwrite (Cook et al., 2003). 
Most  recently,  An  and  Chan  (2008)  show  that  underwriter  reputation  affects  IPO 
underpricing  and  price  revisions.  Underwriters  seeking  to  avoid  a  loss  of  reputation  will 
attempt to gain commercially sensitive information about their clients to help them identify 
and market high quality issues. In this way, investors can infer the quality of an issue when 
specific underwriters put their reputation at stake. Less experienced underwriters, on the other 
hand, avoid this signalling strategy if they are less capable or find it too costly to obtain 
information about the true quality of their borrowers.  
 
However, it is unclear whether the above phenomenon is also at play in the private debt 
market, and whether it is done through the same channel as in the public market. There are 
several reasons why the reputation of an underwriter may have a different effect on bank loan 
structure than on public bonds. While bond underwriters only  act  as intermediaries, loan 
arrangers typically retain a substantial fraction of the loan being issued. This strongly affects 
the potential costs associated with certification of borrowers. Moreover, the bank industry has 
undergone significant restructuring and consolidation (Brook et al., 2000) that most likely 
have impacted outcomes. 
 
A further important feature is that the most reputable loan arrangers may have the capability 
to  sherry-pick  the  best  borrowers,  notably  because  their  certification  effect  may  provide 
                                                 
1 A recent survey is provided in Drucker and Puri (2006). 
2 This approach is consistent with papers on underwriter reputation associated with less severe under-pricing in 
initial public offerings (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Gomes, 2000). Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333469
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benefits to these selected borrowers even beyond the loan market (Cook et al., 2003). This 
selection effect has been evidenced in other financial markets, such as the bond underwriter 
market (Puri, 1996; Fang, 2005) and the IPO market (An and Chan, 2008). More broadly 
speaking,  dealing  with  endogeneity  in  corporate  finance  issues  remains  important,  as 
evidenced by the recent contribution of Wintoki et al. (2010) on controlling for the dynamic 
nature of corporate finance relationships. 
 
In this paper, we investigate how investment bank reputation influences the structure of bank 
loan contracts and thereby the terms at which corporations are able to access debt finance.  
Do  reputable  commercial  banks  that  have  better  access  to  good  borrowers  signal  quality 
through the same channel as bond underwriters? If yes, how does this affect the spread and 
fees  charged?  Does  reputation  affect  deal  characteristics  of  private  debt  through  other 
channels  than  simply  pricing?    Further,  how  does  reputation  influence  the  structure  and 
composition of loan syndicates?  
 
An important departure in this paper is the development of a unified model of bank reputation 
that takes into account both the lending and syndicate markets. This is important because it 
provides the reader with a more complete understanding of the costs and benefits of bank 
reputation. To understand this point, consider the consequences of arrangers choosing not to 
resell any of their loans. It would be clear that there would be no need to certify to others the 
quality of the loans and thus we would witness few differences in loan structure between top 
tier  arrangers  and  other  banks  with  respect  to  certification,  everything  else  being  equal. 
However, arrangers that sell entire issues would very well benefit from certifying the quality 
of the borrowers if they could. Papers on bond markets have not taken this approach. With 
the bond market, it is reasonable to focus simply on a single market, the underwriting market, 
as here it is only intermediaries that resell most of the issued securities. In contrast, lead 
arrangers in the private debt market continue to hold a significant proportion of loans well 
after the issuers’ offering.
4 Consequently, this provides commercial banks with an alternative 
tool to signal quality by retaining large fractions of the deal. Finally, offering better terms to 
the best borrowers would be at some cost to lenders if lenders retain higher fractions of their 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 Gatti et al. (2007) provide evidence of similar effects in project finance. 
4 In recent years, lenders have sold some of these participations through securitization of loans. This however 
does not mean they do not bear the risk anymore, since (besides retaining some of the loan) they typically attach 
credit enhancement guarantees or put options to the securitized loans.  Moreover, the fact that these loans cannot   4
deals.  This  cost  is  not  incurred  by  bond  underwriters  as  they  only  play  the  role  of 
intermediary. This analysis provides a novel perspective on existing empirical findings on the 
extent to which bank reputation matters in private debt markets. The syndicated loan market 
offers a good setting for testing this. 
 
The analysis in this paper provides a number of key empirical results. It shows, consistent 
with the differences between the bond and commercial loan markets, that while reputation 
significantly affects the design of loan contracts, the channel is different from what has been 
observed in bond markets. While most reputable lenders do indeed offer better terms, this is 
consistent with the idea that they also arrange loans for the best borrowers. Moreover, it 
strongly supports the notion that the top tier loan arrangers are able to select the best deals. 
This  suggests  that  reputable  arrangers  self-select  their  borrowers,  which  may  affect  the 
analysis  on  pricing  due  to  self-selection  bias.  However,  when  controlling  for  the  non-
randomness of borrower-lender match, we find that reputable arrangers charge higher spreads 
compared  to  a  situation  where  reputation  does  not  matter.  The  effect  is  strongest  for 
borrowers  without  any  investment  grade  or  credit  rating,  who  most  likely  suffer  from 
information  asymmetry.  This  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  top  tier  banks  exploit  the 
informational  advantage  that  gives  them  more  market  power  to  charge  higher  spreads, 
compared to what borrowers would get in the absence of arranger reputation. The premium 
charged is highest for those who gain most from certification by a top tier lead arranger. 
Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the 1994 banking deregulation 
that  led  to  significant  consolidations  in  the  banking  industry  (the  Riegle-Neal  Interstate 
Banking  and  Branching  Efficiency  Act),
5 including  among  the  largest  commercial  banks. 
This suggests that the resulting mergers have increased the market power of the top tier 
arrangers, who may have charged higher spreads subsequent to market consolidation. While 
reputation  significantly  affects  spreads,  we  find,  however,  no  evidence  that  it  affects  the 
inclusion of restrictive covenants in loan agreements. The latter is best explained by publicly 
available credit rating, such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P), of the borrower, with no evidence 
of  trading  of  price  or  protective  covenants.  These  results  are  robust  for  a  number  of 
alternative specifications. While Fang (2005) obtained different results for the bond market, 
                                                                                                                                                        
be sold that quickly means that lenders bear substantial risk between the time of loan issuance and resale of the 
loan. 
5 See, for example, Kroszner and Strahan (1999), Brook et al. (2000), Levine (2004), and Huang (2008), for 
related discussion on the deregulation of the US banking industry.   5
both  sets  of  results  are  consistent  with  important  differences  observed  between  the  two 
markets, in particular with respect to market concentration at the top. 
 
This raises the question of whether top tier banks ask for lower arranger fees, given their 
spread structure. We find weak evidence that top tier arrangers indeed charge lower arranger 
fees, even when controlling for the self-selection of borrowers. However, they do so only for 
borrowers with credit rating. In line with our results on loan design, this again suggests that 
borrowers that benefit most from certification by the top tier banks (namely, those without a 
rating) are willing to pay more, not only in terms of spread but also fees to the arranger. 
 
Given the role of lead arrangers, we also examine a second channel through which they can 
certify borrower quality: through greater participation in the loan syndicate. In this paper we 
provide evidence that more reputable arrangers indeed hold a larger fraction of the loans in a 
syndicate, though only when controlling for self-selection bias. Combining these findings 
with the results on spreads, we conclude that in the private syndicated loan market, direct 
certification of the loan is more likely through the higher retention of loan amount by the lead 
arranger,  not  through  pricing  (spread).  Interestingly,  this  result  only  holds  for  borrowers 
without credit rating. We find no evidence of certification for rated borrowers. These contrary 
findings on the choice of certification channel between public and private markets can be 
explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. 
 
Our results have important implications for corporate finance, namely for corporations that 
rely  on  debt  to  finance  their  investments.  They  indicate  how  reputation  of  banks  impact 
corporate access to debt finance (extending Nash et al., 2003), how the private debt market 
differs from the public (bond) market (our results are different from Fang, 2005), and which 
companies are more likely to attract reputable arrangers for their loan. Related studies have 
shown that this may further affect how corporations can raise capital in the equity market 
(e.g., Cook et al., 2003, and An and Chan, 2008). Finally, our result can be related to Brook 
et al. (2000) who deals with consolidations in the banking industry, a topic we also refer to in 
our study.  
 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 1 reviews the related literature. Section 2 
offers empirical predictions from the certification hypothesis in the context of the syndicated 
loan market. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 provides details on how the   6
loan syndicate market operates and differs from other debt markets. Section 5 presents the 
empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
1. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
A  significant  quantity  of  research  has  been  dedicated  to  understanding  lead  arrangers’ 
activities  in  the  private  debt  market.  Many  theories  have  emerged,  for  example,  the 
monitoring  hypothesis,  that  posits  a  negative  relationship  between  the  borrower’s 
creditworthiness  and  delegation  to  the  lead  bank  for  monitoring.  An  increased  need  for 
monitoring would lead to smaller lender syndicates (Sufi, 2007). Early work by Smith and 
Warner (1979) discusses the agency cost of debt in terms of claim dilution, underinvestment, 
asset withdrawal and asset substitution. In response to agency problems, debt covenants may 
serve  as  an  ex  post  monitoring  device  to  protect  the  lenders’  renegotiation  position.  In 
general, researchers consider covenants and co-agents as substitutes from the perspective of 
mitigating asymmetries within loan syndicates (Goyal, 2005). Another strand of the literature 
analyses the costs and benefits of lending relationship (Boot, 2000; Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
 
Other relevant papers are those dealing with the use of covenants to reduce agency costs in 
the bank loan or public debt markets. For example, Bradley and Roberts (2004) discuss the 
role of restrictive covenants in US bank loans, showing that a substantial number of loans 
include protective provisions. A few other papers deal with the monitoring role of covenants 
in the public debt market, showing that compared to the loan market bond issuers face fewer 
restrictions (Gilson and Warner, 1998). Moreover, Nash et al. (2003) find evidence that high 
growth firms include fewer dividend covenants in their debt contracts, reflecting a preference 
for flexibility in financing rather than contracting practice. Chava et al. (2009) show some 
variation  in  spread  and  covenants,  finding  no  significant  movement  in  the  direction  of 
bondholder protection, but in the cases of merger protection and poison puts.  
 
There  is  surprisingly  little  empirical  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  reputation  and 
security pricing in the private loan market. Empirical evidence on the impact of the lead 
arranger’s  reputation  has  been  examined  for  the  syndicated  market  only  sparsely,  where 
evidence indicates that more reputable arrangers are able to attract larger syndicates and hold   7
smaller fractions of loans (Lee and Mullineaux, 2001).
6 Sufi (2007) studied the impact of 
asymmetric information between borrower and lead bank on the structure of the syndicate. 
His results are in line with the monitoring hypothesis that states that the lender’s syndicate is 
more concentrated when asymmetric information is stronger, resulting in better monitoring 
incentives of syndicate members. Other papers deal with public debt markets. Fang (2005) 
evaluated  empirically  the  role  of  certification  hypothesis  in  the  public  bond  market.  She 
demonstrates that a reputable bank tends to be more selective in its underwriting decisions 
which are positively related to price improvements for the issuer, providing empirical support 
for a certification role of the underwriter. Her result holds even when controlling for self-
selection bias. This contrasts with our finding for the private debt market, which is roughly 
the same size. Possible reasons for this difference are discussed later.  
 
Other important contributions to this literature are from Puri (1996), Gande et al. (1997), 
Gande et al. (1999), Cremers et al. (2004), Esty and Megginson (2003), Gatti et al. (2007), 
and Narayanan et al. (2007). These papers focus, however, on the public bond market or 
project finance. For instance, Puri (1996) assess the impact of information on underwriter 
terms during the pre-Glass-Steagal Act period (1927-1929), when commercial banks could 
underwrite bonds just as investment banks. Cremers et al. (2004) show that the inclusion of 
specific  covenants  in  bond  contracts  depends  on  the  severity  of  potential  shareholder-
bondholder  conflicts.  Gatti  et  al.  (2007)  find  that  reputable  banks  provide  overall  lower 
spreads for project finance, generating a positive impact on lenders. Narayanan et al. (2007) 
examined whether commercial banks can use their reputation in private markets for their 
bond-underwriting activities.  
 
Our study is also related to the literature strand on syndication. The early work by Wilson 
(1968) and others (e.g., Chowdry and Nanda, 1996) considers the rationale for syndication, 
showing that the risk-sharing effect of syndication drives the market. More recently, Pichler 
and Wilhelm (2001) explored the effect of members of a syndicate group delegating some of 
the monitoring responsibilities to the lead bank. They emphasized that a lead bank’s ability to 
control the composition of the syndicate appears to play a large role in eliminating conflicts 
of interest between lead banks and syndicate members. Panyagometh and Roberts (2003) 
                                                 
6 However, this study did not account for the self-selection bias that arises from the non-randomness of the 
arranger-borrower  match.    In  this  paper,  we  evidence  that  this  is  critical  and  in  fact  provides  opposite 
conclusions. The same holds for Sufi (2007), who also does not control for self-selection.   8
show how syndicate members learn about the reputation effects of lead banks. This result 
documents lead banks by reputation based on average yearly amount of loans syndicated, but 
does  not  document  which  loans  these  banks  arrange  when  evaluating  lead  arranger 
reputation.  Finally,  other  literature  focuses  on  the  effects  of  capital  constraints  or 
informational deficits on the size and distribution of syndicate shares (Jones et al., 2005). 
 
 
2. THEORY OF CERTIFICATION 
 
In this section, we review the impact of bank reputation on certification of borrowers and 
extend it to the private syndicate loan market to derive hypotheses for our particular setting. 
We  focus  our  discussion  on  empirical  predictions  that  specifically  relate  to  the  two 
certification channels examined, namely, loan spread and syndicate structure. 
 
2.1 Certification through Contracting (Reduced Spread) 
 
The certification hypothesis relies on the implicit assumption that more established arrangers 
possess  better  information  on  borrowers.  It  builds  on  theoretical  work  of,  among  others, 
Shapiro  (1983),  Booth  and  Smith  (1986)  and Cook  et  al.  (2003),  who  develop  the  more 
general signaling hypothesis around closely related to financial markets. The syndicated loan 
market  is  one  in  which  lead  arrangers  intermediate  between  corporate  borrowers  and 
syndicate partners.  Lead arrangers typically pass on part of the deal to other lenders by 
seeking syndicate partners after the deal is signed. Therefore, the certification hypothesis 
postulates that reputable lead arrangers may be able to offer better terms (a lower spread) to 
their best clients, which in turn signals the quality of a deal. This enables them to attract the 
best borrowers. Given that such a signal can only be credible from an established player that 
has better information on borrowers, deals with better terms for borrowers are more likely to 
be observed by top tier lead arrangers. Lenders not capable to access privileged information 
may engage in too risky loans when offering similar terms than well informed lenders. Thus, 
the top tier lead arrangers willing to certify their deals put their own reputation at stake. If 
they  were  not  interested  in  signaling  the  quality  of  loans  to  facilitate  sales  within  the 
syndicate, there would be no reason—for the purpose of certification—why arrangers would 
want to accept worse terms. 
   9
This argument supposes that top tier arrangers are better at identifying the true quality of 
borrowers such that at the time deals are negotiated they have useful private information that 
less reputable banks do not have. The arranger may possess private information that leads to 
the conclusion that the borrower has lower risk than is assumed by non-informed actors. Such 
a signal would be costlier to other arrangers if they were to accept similar deals, since a lower 
spread would translate into an expected return that does not compensate fully for the implied 
risk  of  the  borrower.  Thus,  under  the  certification  hypothesis  we  should  expect  more 
reputable arrangers to charge lower spreads.  
 
In practice, this informational advantage for more established arrangers may stem from the 
increased information already collected from past deals (i.e., from a previous relationship 
established when lending to the same borrowers, consistent with the findings of Boot and 
Thakor, 2000) or from better access to shared information between syndicate partners. In 
both cases, top tier banks would have better capabilities for screening borrowers.  
 
For the syndicate structure, signaling quality by means of contract design (i.e., lower spread) 
allows the lead arranger to sell a larger fraction of the loan to syndicate partners, and also 
possibly to attract larger syndicates. Therefore, under this certification channel, we expect 
reputable arrangers to retain a smaller fraction of deals in the syndicate. This in turn provides 
arrangers with greater diversification as more loan participation can be secured from other 
banks. In this way, the lead arrangers can benefit from their signals. 
 
2.2 Certification through Higher Loan Retention (Syndicate Structure) 
 
These last predictions on the structure of syndicates, however, only hold if the arrangers do 
not use the syndicate structure itself as a way to signal the quality of borrowers. Indeed, an 
alternative signaling method would be where arrangers retain a larger fraction of the loan 
within the syndicate, as in the spirit of Leland and Pyle (1977), who take a more general view 
of signaling. This thus conveys the information that the lead arrangers are willing to take on 
greater risk, which could be costly for them in the case of bad loans. Therefore, we would 
expect top tier arrangers with better information about the borrower to retain larger stakes if 
they know the borrower is without risk.  
   10
Note  that  signaling  through  contract  design  (spread)  alleviates  the  need  for  this  second 




2.3 Econometric Testing under Self-Selection Bias 
 
From an econometrical perspective, standard estimation methods cannot be used, since we 
deal with private information that established arrangers possess. Since this information is not 
observable, it is likely that the borrower-lender match is not random.  In other words, simply 
including a dummy variable in the regression specification that accounts for whether or not 
the given arranger is reputable would not enable us to test the certification hypothesis, since it 
is  based  on  the  availability  of  private  (unobservable)  information.  This  is  true  for  both 
certification channels. Thus, we would observe the actual effect only after controlling for the 
non-randomness  of  borrower-lender  match.  This  is  done  using  the  Heckman  correction 
technique (Heckman, 1979), as presented below. If we do not control for this potential source 
of self-selection, we may merely measure a clientele effect specific to reputable arrangers, 
which may be positive or negative.
 8 This is what is captured by merely including a dummy 
variable about the reputation of the lead arranger in the regression equation. 
 
Note  that  the  econometric  procedure  is  different  from  the  endogeneity  problem  often 
encountered in corporate finance studies. While both use the 2SLS technique to adjust for 
their own bias, the adjustment extracted from the first-stage regression is different (Li and 
Prabhala, 2005; Puri, 1996). For the Heckman correction, we compute the Inverse Mills ratio 
(denoted as lambda) as measure of private information. Unlike the endogeneity correction, 
this is a non-linear transformation of the residual term. The first-step regression (selection 
equation) is a standard Probit regression; the second regression an OLS that includes the 
Inverse Mills ratio extracted from the first-step regression to replace the dummy variable that 
accounts for whether or not the given arranger is reputable. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Further signal mechanisms such as debt maturity yield similar conclusions (see, for example, Flannery, 1986; 
Diamond, 1991; and Wei, 2005) from the perspective of lead arrangers (not borrowers). 
8 When  not  controlling  for  this  self-selection  bias,  we  may  obtain  opposite  results  under  the  certification 
hypothesis.  Therefore,  in  the  presence  of  informational  advantages  for  more  reputable  arrangers,  it  is  not   11
3. DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
For this study, we used Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, which comprises data 
on a large sample of syndicated loans done since 1987. This database provides information 
on the structure of the deals (including positive and negative covenants), the borrower, the 
arrangers and syndicate members. We limit our sample to deals that include a tear sheet and 
for which we have complete information on our relevant variables. Tear sheets are documents 
that are derived from the loan documents and provide comprehensive details on the terms and 
conditions of deals. Tear sheets allow crosschecking of the information provided by the main 
database (downloadable in spreadsheet format), if needed, and provides much of the missing 
information on deals.
9 The time period considered is 1987-2005. The final sample includes 
2,368 observations. The unit of observations is a loan facility (i.e., a tranche), given that some 
loans are raised in more than one tranche. In this case, each tranche has separate terms and 
thus must be considered separately.
10 
 
Table 1 provides the definitions of variables. One of our main variables is the distinction 
between top tier arrangers and other arrangers. We define a bank as a top tier arranger in a 
particular year if it was one of the biggest market players in the year before the considered 
loan  transaction.  To  construct  this  dummy  variable,  we  proceeded  as  follows.  We  first 
calculated the market share of all the market participants for each year, based on the total 
annual deal amount done. The variable Top Tier Bank then takes the value of one if at least 
one lead arranger is on the list of the three biggest players in the year before the considered 
deal. For the years prior to 2000, we used the five largest players, given that the lack of 
consolidation makes the cutoff of the top three less clear. This means that the list of top tier 
                                                                                                                                                        
possible  to  investigate  the  hypothesis  without  controlling  for  self-selection  bias.  We  examine  this  in  the 
empirical section of the paper. 
9 For instance, the name of the lead arranger is not always mentioned in the actual database (especially for 
earlier transactions). However, this information is always reported in the tear sheet, either directly or in the form 
of comments. Where information was missing, we checked whether it was in the tear sheet. This was done for 
the most important variables. For instance, some values of fees are only reported in the tear sheet. Not double-
checking this information would lead someone to interpret no information in the database as an absence of fees, 
which at times may be wrong. Therefore, limiting the sample to observations with tear sheets guarantees a 
sample with more reliable information. However, it creates a sample bias towards larger deals, since smaller 
deals rarely have a tear sheet provided. Also, it forces us to stop the analysis in 2005, data at which no tear 
sheets are provided anymore. 
10 In the empirical analysis, standard deviations of coefficients will be clustered at the facility level whenever 
feasible.   12
banks is updated every year based on market share in the previous year.
11 We also corrected 




The  dependent  variables  for  the  structure  of  loan  contracts  are  the  spread  and  various 
restrictive covenants. We use the spread of the loan in basis points above the LIBOR rate (the 
main rate for interbank deposits). All loan contracts included in the DealScan database are 
based on this same spread. This also eliminates the need for controlling for levels of interest 
rate in the regression analyses. For the analysis of arranger fees, we consider the two most 
important  fees  at  the  time  of  deal  arrangement:  upfront  fees  and  commitment  fees.  Our 
variable on fees takes the sum of both, giving the total basis points. 
 
Finally, for all the listed companies, we collected information on large shareholders at the 
time the deals were done. Using the proxy statements from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Filings & Forms (EDGAR), we constructed two variables: the size of the 
largest  blockholder  and  the  number  of  blockholders.  In  this  paper,  a  blockholder  is  any 
shareholder with at least 5% ownership in the borrowing company.
13 These variables are 
included  in  some  of  the  specifications  since  they  may  capture  the  degree  of  monitoring 
needed  by  lenders.  Creditor-shareholder  conflicts  may  appear  if  the  borrower  has  a 
concentrated ownership, which may require more monitoring. If top tier banks were better 
monitors, we would expect a positive effect. Similarly, such conflicts potentially affect the 
optimal syndicate size. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Two points are worth being mentioned. First, this approach of identifying top tier banks is the same as that of, 
for example, Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Asker and Ljungqvist (2006). However, Fang (2005) follows a 
different approach for the public bond market. She only constructs a single league table that comprises all deals 
of the complete time period considered so that the list of top tier banks remains constant over the complete time 
period. This is cannot be done here, given the changes in annual rankings observed in the first half of our time 
period (cf. Table 3, Panel A), and the mergers and acquisitions among banks in more recent years. And second, 
some  studies  (e.g.,  Megginson  and  Weiss,  1991)  measure  reputation  with  market  shares  directly,  without 
transforming the league tables into a dummy variable. This allows having a continuous variable and avoids 
setting an arbitrary cutoff level on how many arrangers should be considered as reputable. The drawback is that 
it does not enable to adapt the variable for possible self-selection bias; this requires a binary variable. Thus, we 
employ the former measurement.  
12 As robustness check, we performed the analysis by taking the top 5 lenders for each year (instead of top 5 
until 1999 and top 3 for follow-up years). The main results are qualitatively similar. Results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
13 The SEC filings only record shareholders that hold at least 5% of outstanding shares (www.sec.gov).   13
4. SYNDICATED LOAN MARKET 
 
4.1 Development of the Market 
 
In this section, we describe certain characteristics of the syndicated lending market in the US 
and describe how its landscape evolved over the period 1987 to 2005. The syndicated loan 
market,  which  brings  together  the  primary  loan  distribution  process  and  secondary  loan 
market,  is  a  widely  used  channel  for  large  corporations  and  mid-sized  firms.  Syndicated 
credits are a hybrid of private and public debt involving the sale of a loan to a group of 
commercial banks arranged as a syndicate. The nature of the syndicated loan market implies 
a banking model in which banks are mostly concerned with deal-specific transactions. 
 
The development of syndicated lending first developed in the US in the late 1980s. Between 
1986 and 1989, a new type of transaction form, the leveraged buyout (LBO), was widely used 
to  acquire  public  companies.  In  order  to  manage  the  lending  volumes,  large  New  York 
commercial banks established a syndication process which resulted in underwriting groups 
arranging,  underwriting  and  distributing  non-investment  grade  loans  to  a  group  of 
institutional participants. The market for investment grade syndicated loans grew in the early 
1990s when banks, due to a change in the credit cycle, became less interested in financing 
corporate acquisitions and more interested in arranging loans for lower-geared borrowers. 
Syndicated  lending  to  top  tier  corporate  firms  grew  strongly  throughout  the  1990s  as 
companies took advantage of the new liquidity in the secondary loan market to access funds 
for general corporate purposes (Jones et al., 2005). The increasing tendency for banks to trade 
credit participations on the secondary market was reflected in the prevalence of transferability 
clauses in loan contracts (Drucker and Puri, 2009). The total size of the US secondary market 
was 25% of total loans between 1993 and 2003 (Gadanecz, 2004). In some respects, the 
syndicated lending market resembles the public debt market in terms of the notable division 
of the market between investment and non-investment grade lending. 
 
A  new  pattern  in  the  syndicated  loan  market  developed  between  1995  and  1997  when 
institutional investors began to accept syndicated loans facilities as an alternative to bonds. 
As a consequence, syndicated lending increased from $1.2 trillion in 1996 to almost $2.1 
trillion in 2001, with gross issuance of facilities increasing from $214 billion in 1990 to 
$1,196 billion in 2001 (Armstrong, 2003).  Refinancing of new facilities also increased in   14
trading  volume,  totalling  approximately  US$  145  billion  in  2003,  with  distressed  loans 
making up a large share of the market (Gadanecz, 2004). 
 
Over the last decade and a half, since the US banking deregulation, the US syndicated loan 
market has clearly become a major source of financing on behalf of a range of different 
borrowers. In particular, acquisition-led lending played an important role in the early years 
and provided the market with an important stimulus to introduce syndication to structure the 
issuance of loans. During the mid-1990s, in response to enormous demand, the market for 
syndicated loans for the investment-grade sector provided a complex array of facilities to 
meet the changing needs of general corporate borrowers. More recently, leveraged lending 
for acquisition-related transactions has grown to reflect changes in mergers and acquisitions, 
and  the  private  equity  market.  While  the  demand  for  syndicated  loans  will  continue  to 
fluctuate  across  some  sectors,  the  continuing  demand  for  primary  loans  by  corporate 
borrowers and the deepening of the secondary market suggest that the development of this 
sector of the market will continue.   
 
4.2 Market Share of Commercial Banks 
 
Table 2 shows a list of the top commercial banks involved as arranging or participating banks 
in the syndicated loan market during the 1991-2005 and 2001-2005 time periods, by number 
of  deals  and  amount  arranged.    In  the  US  market,  the  syndicated  loan  market  is  highly 
concentrated.  The  top  three  domestic  banks,  JP  Morgan  Chase,  Bank  of  America  and 
Citigroup, accounted for about 69% of all deals during the 1991-2005 period.  
 
Table 3 gives further insights into how the syndicated loan market has evolved over time to 
eventually lead to the highly concentrated market as can be seen today. The table shows 
market share (calculated for deal amounts) of the largest, three largest and five largest banks 
in  each  year.  Market  concentration  increased  over  time,  with  the  three  largest  arrangers 
taking  60.8%  of  the  deals  in  2005  as  compared  to  40.6%  in  the  late  1980s  (Panel  A). 
Moreover, while there were changes in the top arrangers over time in earlier years, there has 
been little change in the top three rankings in the latter years, with JP Morgan Chase taking 
the first position, Bank of America the second and Citigroup the third. 
   15
Much of this shift in concentration has been driven by mergers and acquisitions. In Table 2, 
all the deals of the acquired banks were imputed to the acquiring bank. This largely explains 
the disappearance of some banks in the rankings provided in Table 3, Panel A. For instance, 
Chase Manhattan Bank acquired Chemical Bank in 1996, which subsequently was acquired 
by  JP  Morgan  in  2000.  Further,  major  mergers  and  acquisitions  in  the  US  commercial 
banking industry are listed in Panel C of Table 3. Panel B of Table 3 presents the evolution of 
syndicate structure over the same time period.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the changes in the contemporary loan market over the period 1987 to 
2005.  During  the  1990s,  key  restructuring  changes  in  both  segments  of  the  loan  market 
distinguished it from the public bond market in many respects. First, the role of banks in the 
loan  market  was  very  different.  It  was  not  limited  to  intermediation  but  rather  arrangers 
usually retained the largest fraction of the deal after the transaction was completed. In the 
bond market, underwriters primarily played the intermediary between the borrower and a 
large number of investors, each buying a small fraction of the securities issued. The exact 
content  of  a  deal  was,  therefore,  of  much  greater  interest  to  loan  arrangers  than  bond 
underwriters.  Second,  the  latter  seemed  to  be  less  concentrated  at  the  top.  Indeed,  Fang 
(2005) estimated that the five largest bond underwriters in the US held a market share of 60% 
for the period 1991-2000, while the top five US lenders accounted for about 75% of the 
market  during  the  same  time  period.  Moreover,  the  distinction  between  top  tier  bond 
underwriters and other bond underwriters seemed less clear as the decay is relatively smooth. 
This contrasts with the private debt market, where there is a sharp drop after the top three 
(Table 2). Third, Fang (2005) identified 51 unique bond underwriters in the US during the 
same period 1991-2000. For private debt, the number of lenders is by far larger. Finally, as 
you would expect for the US, the players are quite different due to the regulations. The top 
tier  bond  underwriters  are  Goldman  Sachs,  Merrill  Lynch,  Morgan  Stanley,  Salomon 
Brothers,  CSFB,  Lehman  Brothers,  JP  Morgan  and  Donaldson,  Lufkin  &  Jenrette  (Fang, 
2005). Their private debt is reported in Table 2. However, the major players in the US private 
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In this section, we first present summary statistics of the sample. In the multivariate analysis 
that follows, we then investigate the effect of having a top tier bank as a lead arranger on the 
structure of loans, the level of spread and the inclusion of restrictive covenants in particular. 
We further investigate the impact on arranger fees to examine whether top tier arrangers 
charge higher fees for arranging loans. Given the observed loan contracts, we then examine 
how  top  tier  lead  arrangers  structure  their  lender  syndicates  and  choose  their  degree  of 
retention in the loans they arrange. 
 
As in many related studies (Puri, 1996; Gande et al., 1997, 1999; Fang, 2005),
14 we use 
Heckman two-stage selection models to estimate the impact of top tier banks on contracting 
(Heckman, 1979; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003).
15 This is due to the fact that reputation 
could  be  related  to  private  information  that  may  lead  to  self-selection.  Our  empirical 
predictions  rely  on  the  assumption  that  more  established  arrangers  possess  superior 
information. In this case, the deals done by top tier banks may not be a random sample. 
However, we are not able to directly observe the relevant private information. As indicated 
later, our results exhibit a strong self-selection bias that justifies the use of this methodology. 
To demonstrate this, we also provide ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations that do not 
take into account self-selection. 
 
It is important to stress the difference in interpretation between the simple OLS estimation 
and the one that controls for self-selection. The first one gives us information as to whether 
top  tier  banks  on  average  offer  better  terms  to  borrowers.  The  second  one  examines  the 
impact of private information—and thus reputation—by comparing the observed outcome 
with the one that would have occurred if top tier arrangers had not had private information, 
which in equilibrium we would not observe if self-selection occurs. What does this mean for 
the certification hypothesis? In equilibrium with informed and uninformed arrangers, the best 
borrowers  self-select  to  be  financed  by  informed  arrangers  and  the  other  borrowers  by 
uninformed ones.  
 
                                                 
14 See also Li and Prabhala (2005) for a general discussion on the use of this type of model in corporate finance. 
15 Alternative estimation methods exist to account for possible selection biases, including a maximum likelihood 
version of the Heckman correction. More recently, Wintoki et al. (2010) offer a solution for related endogeneity 
issues  in  a  dynamic  context.  Here  we  use  the  Heckman  two-step  method  that  is  traditionally  used  in  the 
literature that most closely related to ours.   17
While  exclusion  restrictions  may  not  necessarily  be  needed  in  our  Heckman  two-step 
regressions due to the non-linearity the Inverse Mills ratio, we nevertheless use a different 
specification than in the second regression equation. In practice, an identification problem 
may still arise if the non-linearity is not large enough (Li and Prabhala, 2005; Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003). We therefore use the two variables Sales (as a measure for borrower size) 
and Previous Loan Dummy in the Probit regression; they are however not included in the 
second-stage regression. Following Fang (2005), we also use the variable Investment Grade 
Dummy instead of dummies for each rating to further enhance the quality of identification; 
individual dummies are used in the second-step regression. This was also done for all other 
Heckman estimations done throughout this study. Sales are likely to affect selection (i.e., Top 
Tier Bank dummy in the first-stage regression) but not Spread as it is not necessarily related 
to performance (and thus the borrowing terms). The variable Sales instead measures well the 
size of the borrower. It is likely to correlate with the market share of the lender, and larger 
companies may find it easier to access the largest lenders and thus the most reputable ones. 
We  therefore  expect  a  positive  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  having  loans  arranged  by  a 
reputable bank. In contrast, small firms may need to negotiate with local banks. This same 
variable was also used as part of the identification strategy by Fang (2005) for controlling for 
self-selection in the bond market. Along similar veins, a borrower that already received a loan 
in the past from a given bank may be more prone to receive further funding from this same 
bank. This view is in line with a bank relationship hypothesis (Boot, 2000; Boot and Thakor, 
2000). This is captured by the variable Previous Loan Dummy that equals one if the borrower 
already  received  a  loan  from  the  considered  bank.  If  this  previous  loan  was  from  an 
established lender, it is more likely to receive another loan from the same reputable lender.
16  
 
To  our  knowledge,  no  test  of  exogeneity  exists  for  the  Heckman  two-step  estimation 
procedure (i.e., similar to the Sargan test for standard 2SLS endogeneity estimations). Still, it 
is important to note that the quality of our estimations ultimately rely on the specification of 
the first-stage regressions and on the assumption that our additional variables are uncorrelated 
with  the  residuals  of  the  second-step  regression.  As  in  most  corporate  finance  problems, 
variables are rarely fully exogenous. However, we believe that if some endogeneity may exist 
here with the variables Sales and Previous Loan Dummy, a significant part should be indirect, 
as many of the effects may be captured by the remaining variables included in the second-
                                                 
16 As robustness we further used the number of previous loans obtained instead of the Previous Loan Dummy,   18
stage specification. For instance, firm size (as proxied by Sales) is also in part captured by the 
industry dummies included as well as the variable Borrower is a Parent Company (dummy). 
It also correlates with Loan Amount.
17  
 
Finally,  note  that  in  all  the  regressions  (both  equations)  we  include  controls  for  market 
conditions such as the Nasdaq Composite Index (in natural log), industry dummies (using 12 
categories in total) and year dummies. 
 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of our sample as well as sub-samples. It highlights a 
number of interesting facts. First, 56.3% of loans involve at least one top tier bank as lead 
arranger. (recall that the variable Top Tier Bank is equal to one if at least one lead arranger is 
top tier bank.) This percentage is roughly the same size as the average market size of top tier 
banks (see rankings in Tables 2 and 3). 
 
Second, the lead arranger holds on average 24.7% of the total loan amount after the syndicate 
is structured. A top tier lead arranger retains significantly less in the syndicate (19.6% versus 
31.2%). This suggests that lead arrangers retain a significant fraction of participation rights in 
the loans they arrange, but that top tier banks are able to sell a substantially larger fraction to 
junior banks participating in the syndicate. 
 
Third, loans issued by top tier lead arrangers differ in from loans provided by other arrangers 
with respect to spreads. The average spread is about 35 basis points lower for deals arranged 
by the top tier banks (165.0 versus 200.6 basis points). Also the loan size is much larger (note 
also that this amount is the tranche loan; when focusing at the loan level, the average amounts 
are US$ 992.4 million for loans arranged by reputable banks versus US$ 489.2 million for the 
others). Arranger fees are on average about 38 basis points, which is significantly lower in 
magnitude than the loan spread. Moreover, 68.4% are tranched loans. However, this does not 
                                                                                                                                                        
which yielded similar results. 
17 One particular concern may be with respect to the variable Previous Loan Dummy, since it may be correlated 
with the extent of unobservable information. This concern was in particular raised by the referee, who we thank 
for this worthwhile comment. To check for this, we also included the variable in the second-stage regression to 
see  whether  it  has  explanatory  power  for  the  Spread.  It turns  out  that  this  is  not  the  case  in  most  of  the 
specifications. Regardless the sub-sample considered however, the coefficient of the Inverse Mills ratio remains 
significant and strong. Results are available upon request.     19
mean that the majority of the loans are actually tranched, since tranching is clustered within a 
smaller subset of loans. This large percentage is primarily attributable to the fact that our unit 
of observation is a tranche and not a loan. 
 
Finally, top tier arrangers are less involved in arranging deals where the borrower has either 
no S&P rating or lacks an investment grade (i.e., a grade of BBB or higher). Therefore, top 
tier arrangers are more involved in lending to companies with an investment grade. This is 
consistent  with  the  previous  finding  that  spreads  are  lower,  possibly  due  to  lower  risk 
transactions. 
 
5.2 Deals Done by Top Tier Banks (1
st Stage Regressions) 
 
Table 5 presents the results on the likelihood of having a top tier bank as lead arranger. This 
analysis  is  useful  in  follow-up  analyses,  as  we  use  self-selection  models  to  estimate  the 
impact  of  top  tier  arrangers  on  contract  characteristics,  which  requires  estimating  the 
likelihood  of  having  a  specific  transaction  arranged  by  a  top  tier  bank.  These  Probit 
regressions are at the same time the first-stage results of the two-step estimations.  
 
Columns (1) – (5) in Table 5 show the results for the full sample. In sum, top tier banks are 
more likely to arrange larger deals (variable Loan Amount). This is in line with the view that 
large banks are necessary for large transactions. Moreover, borrowers with investment grade 
are more likely to raise private debt from more reputable arrangers. Both of these results are 
robust to alternative specifications as shown in the table. On the other hand, concentrated 
ownership does not seem to matter: neither the variable Size of Largest Block nor Number of 
Blockholders is significant.
18 Also, larger firms (measured by Sales) are more likely to have 
their loans arranged by reputable banks, which may be explained by their easier access to 
large, more reputable banks.  
 
In Regressions (6) – (8) of Table 5, we show the results for different sub-samples: Regression 
(6) for deals with investment grades; Regressions (7) for deals that do not have an investment 
grade (i.e., either having no rating at all or a rating below BBB); and Regressions (8) for 
                                                 
18 The main reason for including these variables is to determine whether or not more established arrangers are 
needed when the borrower has concentrated ownership and thus may require more monitoring. If top tier banks 
are better monitors, we would expect a positive effect.   20
deals with ratings below BBB.   Again, the largest deals are most likely to be arranged by top 
tier banks, regardless of the sub-sample considered.  
 
At the bottom of Table 5, we provide F-statistics for the exclusion of our two additional 
variables (Sales and Previous Loan Dummy) in order to assess relevance. In all the cases, 
tests  are  highly  significant,  expect  for  Regressions  (6)  and  (8).  This  indicates  that  both 
variables have strong explanatory power in general, but we need to be more cautious about 
results pertaining to sub-samples. The identification however does not only rely on these two 
variables, unlike the standard 2SLS estimations (Lee and Prabhala, 2005, and Bascle, 2008). 
For  Heckman  two-step  self-selection  estimations,  additional  identification  stems  from  the 
non-linearity derived from the first-step regression when calculating the Inverse Mills ratio. 
In addition, we follow the strategy used by Fang (2005) in that we include in the second-step 
regressions dummy variables for each type of S&P rating instead of the Investment Grade 
Dummy  used  in  the  first-step  regression.  Still,  one  must  recognize  that  the  identification 
strategy in the Heckman two-step procedure relies on the quality of the first-step specification 
and  its  non-linearity.  To  our  knowledge,  no  straightforward  test  exists  to  assess  the 
exogeneity  and  validity  as  in  the  case  of  the  traditional  2SLS  estimation  method  for 
simultaneity (Li and Prabhala, 2005, and Bascle, 2008). 
 
5.3 Effect on Loan Spread (2
nd Stage Regressions) 
 
In this section, we examine the effect of the presence of a top tier lead arranger on contract 
design.  Given  that  contract  design  is  multi-dimensional,  we  examine  the  effect  of  the 
presence  of  a  top  tier  arranger  on  the  inclusion  of  covenants  related  to  free  cash  flow 
problems, voting rights, shareholder-debtholder problem, financial ratios, as well as on the 
negotiated  spread.  We  control  for  a  number  of  borrower  characteristics,  such  as  the 
borrower’s  rating  and  deal  type.  Rating  is  used  as  a  measure  of  risk.  The  number  of 
observations varies depending on the information availability of each dependent variable.  
 
Table 6 shows the results on the level of the spread (above the LIBOR rate). From the simple 
OLS estimation (Regression (1)), it appears that top tier arrangers provide loans at a lower 
spread than other arrangers. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. This 
supports the certification hypothesis. However, as mentioned before, it primarily captures the 
clientele effect and does not take into account the availability of private information. When   21
controlling  for  self-selection  (Heckman  two-step  estimations),  we  in  fact  obtain  opposite 
results (the parameter lambda, which refers to the inverse Mills’ ratio). 
 
For the full sample (Regression (2)), the parameter lambda is significantly positive at the 5% 
level.  The  fact  that  we  obtain  very  different  outcomes  from  the  two  estimations  clearly 
indicates  that  top  tier  arrangers  are  able  to  self-select  deals.  While  top  tier  arrangers  on 
average do charge lower spreads, it is largely due to self-selection.  This thus leads to a 
prediction opposite to that offered by the certification hypothesis. The selected borrowers, 
therefore, are charged higher spreads than in a scenario where reputation does not matter.  
This means that the most established lenders use their position not to certify but rather exploit 
borrowers through the market power they enjoy as one of the largest arrangers of syndicated 
loans. How can this result be interpreted? One likely possibility is that top lead arrangers 
instead  certify  quality  of  borrowers  through  the  second  channel,  namely,  through  higher 
retention of the loans arranged. Therefore, we still have to examine this other channel before 
rejecting the certification hypothesis. Here, this means that lead arrangers use the resulting 
market power from their private information to extract rents from some borrowers. In fact, 
borrowers may be willing to pay higher spreads if a loan that is arranged by a top tier bank 
sends a positive signal to investors in the equity markets. Cook et al. (2003) provide evidence 
for such benefit, suggesting that borrowers may indeed be willing to accept higher spreads 
from certifying loan arrangers. 
 
Some additional results are worth mentioning. First, the spread is lower if the borrower is the 
parent company as opposed to a subsidiary. This is in line with the notion that loans are better 
secured if issued by the parent company, since more assets may be available. Second, the 
better the rating of the borrower, the lower the spread. This is in line with the intuition that 
less risky borrowers obtain better terms. However, it appears that companies without any 
S&P rating obtain a lower spread than those with a rating. This suggests that the pool of 
borrowers  without  rating  is  of  better  quality  than  the  pool  of  rated  companies  without 
investment grade (i.e., rating below BBB), where the spread can be significantly higher. 
 
Regressions  (4)  –  (12)  show  the  same  model  specification  but  for  different  sub-samples. 
Overall,  these  results  strongly  suggest  that  top  tier  arrangers  are  able  to  exploit  their 
dominance with borrowers that do not have an investment grade, either because they have a   22
rating  below  BBB  or  no  rating  at  all
19 (see  Regressions  (5)  and  (8)),  but  not  the  other 
borrowers.  For  the  very  best  deals—i.e.,  those with  an  investment  grade—competition  is 
fierce. This suggests that borrowers with investment grade are not willing to pay more for 
taking loans from top tier banks, but others do—possibly as a way to enhance their profile. 
Indeed, if top tier banks are able to select the best deals, obtaining a loan from a top tier bank 
may  improve  the  credibility  of  a  company  that  does  not  have  an  investment  grade 
(Regressions (5) and (6)) or that has no rating at all (Regression (8)). They are then ready to 
pay  a  premium.  On  the  other  hand,  companies  with  an  investment  grade  already  have 
creditworthiness from their high rating (Regression (4)). This limits top tier banks in charging 
higher spreads to the most credit-worthy borrowers. 
 
Further, worthwhile analysis pertains to deals done after the change in US regulations in the 
mid 1990s that triggered a wave of important mergers and acquisitions in the commercial 
banking industry (see Section 4.2). Since competition among the largest banks was reduced, 
we may expect the market power of the top tier arrangers to have increased during the more 
recent sample in our paper. In line with this intuition, we find that top tier banks were indeed 
primarily able to extract higher spreads during the second time period (after 1995) but not in 
the first (Regressions (9) and (10)). 
 
The last analysis deals with the possible presence of asymmetric information that may be 
particularly  severe  for  some  subsets  of  deals  considered.  We  therefore  split  the  sample 
according to whether or not the borrower is listed. The intuition is that listed firms are more 
scrutinized by analysts and thus are more likely to exhibit less asymmetric information than 
firms that are not listed. We expect the impact of reputation to be strongest for firms that are 
not  listed,  since  these  are  likely  suffering  the  most  from  asymmetric  information.  In  our 
sample, about half of the loan transactions are made by listed firms (1210 listed versus 1158 
non-listed).  Our  results  show  that  whether  the  borrower  is  listed  does  also  matter 
(Regressions (11) and (12)). While both types of firms are affected by the reputation of lead 
arrangers, private borrowers face higher spreads than listed ones. This confirms results that 
private firms are more opaque and exhibit greater asymmetric information problems (Sufi, 
2007).  
 
                                                 
19 This is qualitatively similar to the findings of Sufi (2007), who categorizes borrowers without rating as those   23
Finally, let us mention that we also investigated the impact of lead arranger reputation on 
other loan characteristics, in particular the inclusion of certain restrictive covenants and loan 
maturity  (results  not  reported  here).  We  could  find  almost  no  effect  on  these  other  loan 
characteristics, except for loan maturity that tended to be negative. Overall, it is worthwhile 
mentioning that these findings  go against the idea that top tier arrangers might trade off 
restrictive covenants for a higher spread in a different way than other arrangers, as suggested 
by the Agency Theory of Covenants or the Costly Contracting Hypothesis (see for a related 
discussion, for example, Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Reisel, 2004; and Chava et al., 2009). 
These hypotheses postulate that restrictive covenants and spread are substitutes. Thus, some 
arrangers may differ in their preferred mix of covenants and spread. Given that lead arranger 
reputation here affects spread but not covenants, our analysis does not simply capture some 
form  of  variation  of  these  hypotheses.  At  the  same  time,  our  results  do  not  refute  these 
hypotheses either, since we do not directly test them. However, our evidence indicates that 
the picture is much richer than what has been suggested by previous studies.  
 
5.4 Effect on Arranger Fees 
 
These findings raise important questions about the fee structure charged by top tier arrangers 
compared to other arrangers. Given that they charge higher spreads, do they give up some of 
these benefits to borrowers through lower fees, or are they capable of extracting further costs 
through extra fees? Fang (2005) found that reputable bond underwriters offer lower yield 
spreads to companies but indeed charge higher underwriter fees, making their certification 
ability valuable. 
 
The results on arranger fees for the syndicated loan market are provided in Table 7, and 
summarized as follows. Fees on average tend to be about five basis points lower for deals 
arranged by top tier arrangers, suggesting that they indeed pass on to borrowers some of the 
benefits they extract through higher spreads. However, this result is only weakly significant 
when controlling for the non-randomness of borrower-lender matches. Only borrowers with 
credit ratings benefit from these lower arranger fees (Regression (6)). Interestingly, these are 
precisely  the  group  of  borrowers  that  were  not  charged  higher  spreads  due  to  arranger 
reputation. In line with previous results, this suggests that borrowers requiring certification 
                                                                                                                                                        
with the highest asymmetric information.   24
are paying most for having their loans arranged by top tier arrangers, most likely because 
they are also benefiting most from the resulting certification. However, these reduced fees 
appear to have largely disappeared subsequent to the consolidation wave (Regressions (8) and 
(9)), perhaps due to the increased power of reputable banks after the various acquisitions 
among the largest arranging banks. 
 
5.5 Effect on Structure of Loan Syndicate 
 
From the  contracts observed, we now analyze the impact on the syndicate structure. We 
analyze how this impact affects the syndicate size (number of lenders in the syndicate) and 
the  fraction  of  total  deal  amount  retained  by  the  lead  arranger.  Again,  we  control  for  a 
number of borrower characteristics, such as the borrower’s rating and deal type, as well as 
market conditions. As before, we use a Heckman two-step procedure to estimate the effects, 
together with the OLS estimations. 
 
The results on the structure of the loan syndicate are shown in Table 8. Regressions (1) and 
(5) in Panel A use standard OLS estimation, and are again evidence the presence of self-
selection bias. This indicates that not correcting for self-selection bias would again  yield 
wrong conclusions with regards to the impact of bank reputation. Regression (2) shows that 
top tier banks build smaller syndicates than other banks, although we found earlier that they 
also arrange the largest deals. This contrasts with the results of earlier studies that came to the 
opposite  conclusion,  such  as  that  of  Lee  and  Mullineaux  (2001)  and  Sufi  (2007),  who, 
however, did not control for self-selection bias. Indeed, estimations of the same specification 
without Heckman correction (Regression (1)) also suggest in our sample that top tier banks 
would lead to larger syndicates (on average about two lenders less). While we do not refute 
results from previous studies, some of the effects may however come from the fact that lead 
arrangers may strategically select those borrowers for which they have private information at 
hand  before  the  screening  process  even  begins.  This  leads  to  a  non-random  sample  of 
observations, since the intensity of investigation and the degree of monitoring needed may 
not be randomly distributed anymore between informed and non-informed lenders. We adopt 
the methodology used by Fang (2005) and others, who consider this correction as important. 
While many studies show qualitatively similar results after a self-selection correction, in the 
context studied here this critically affects results for syndicate structure (Table 8) but also 
loan spreads (Table 6).   25
 
The  effect  of  the  structure  of  the  loan  syndicate  remains  statistically  significant  when 
including the fraction of the deal amount retained by the lead arranger. Note, however, that 
this variable is endogenous so that we need to be careful. At the same time, a top tier arranger 
on  average  holds  a  significantly  larger  fraction  of  closed  deals  than  other  lead  arrangers 
(Regression (6), Panel A of Table 8). This indicates that top tier arrangers sell a smaller stake 
of the loan to other banks, possibly either because of the fact that these are better deals or 
because there are fewer lenders participating in the syndicate.  
 
Since both the variables Number of Lenders in Syndicate and Fraction of Deal Retained by 
Lead Arranger are simultaneously determined, we propose an alternative analysis approach 
that circumvents the endogeneity issue at hand. We compare the fraction actually held by the 
lead arranger (the variable Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger) with the fraction 
that the lead arranger would hold if the loan were shared uniformly among N lenders; i.e., the 
fraction 1/N. For example, if there were N=5 partners in the syndicate, the loan would be 
shared uniformly if each held 20%. The dependent variable used here is the ratio of both 
fractions (Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger divided by 1/N; i.e., Fraction of Deal 
Retained by Lead Arranger ´ N). This measure corrects for syndicate size by adjusting the 
dependent variable directly instead of including a variable on the right-hand side. A positive 
effect of the presence of a top tier arranger then means that the latter retains a larger fraction 
of the deal amount than under the equal sharing rule of 1/N. 
 
The  results  on  fraction  held  by  largest  lead  arranger  according  to  number  of  lenders  are 
provided  in  Panel  B  of  Table  8.  The  OLS  estimation  indicates  no  significant  impact 
(Regression (9)). When adjusting for the non-randomness of borrower selection by top tier 
arrangers, we still find no statistically significant impact in the full sample (Regressions (10) 
and (11)). This suggests that overall top tier arrangers do not need to signal borrower quality 
through this secondary channel. This result is robust when controlling for the presence of a 
large blockholder in the borrowing firm (Regression (11)).  
 
However, we find that top tier banks retain significantly less than under equal sharing for the 
sub-sample of loans for borrowers with an investment grade (Regression (12)) or at least with 
a credit rating (Regression (15)). In other words, the impact of top tier arrangers is significant 
for selected sub-samples where certification is least important, namely, for borrowers with   26
investment grade (see Regressions (12) – (16) in Table 8, Panel B). Moreover, we find the 
opposite  effect  for  borrowers  facing  the  strongest  asymmetric  information,  namely,  those 
without any rating. These same borrowers  are  also the ones that  get charged the highest 
spreads.  Results  show  that  (Table  8,  Regression  (16))  reputable  arrangers  retain  larger 
fractions of the loans of these borrowers, which is in line with the notion that arrangers retain 
more as a way to certify the quality of such borrowers. This leads to the conclusion that 
certification in the syndicated loan market is not through spread but higher retention in the 
syndicate (our second channel). This result contrasts strongly with the public debt market 
(Fang, 2005), but concurs with the differences between the two markets. While arrangers 
only  serve  as  intermediaries  in  the  public  market,  in  the  private  market  they  typically 
participate in the syndicate, providing borrowers with this second channel through which 
certification may occur.  
 
In this study, we have explored two potential certification channels that are, however, likely 
to be jointly determined: (1) contracting; and (2) loan retention by the lead arranger in the 
syndicate.  Analyzed  individually,  we  found  support  for  the  second  channel.  Given  the 
difficulty in controlling for endogeneity in our particular context, we estimated the previous 
regressions on spreads for the sub-sample where the lead arranger eventually retains a high 
fraction of the loan in the syndicate and the sub-sample where the lead arranger retains a low 
fraction.  To  separate  these  two  sub-samples,  we  set  up  the  distribution  of  the  variable 
Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger and calculate the percentiles of the distribution. 
As the threshold value for the first sub-sample, we use the fourth quarter of the distribution 
(i.e., all the observations above the 75th percentile); for the latter sub-sample, we take the 
first quarter (i.e., all observations in the lower 25th percentile of the distribution). Table 9 
provides  the  results  of  the  regression  estimations,  which  suggest  the  likely  presence  of 
endogeneity. 
 
Due to the possible substitutability of both certification channels, we would expect a positive 
relationship between higher retention of the lead arranger and loan spreads charged. We find 
indeed  that  spreads  are  higher  for  reputable  arrangers,  when  controlling  for  the  non-
randomness, in the sub-sample where lead arrangers eventually retain larger fractions of the 
loan in the syndicate (Regression (4)). Interestingly, again this result only holds for loans 
arranged for borrowers that are benefiting most from having their loans arranged by a top tier 
bank, namely, borrowers without an investment grade (Regression (8)). The effect is slightly   27
negative for the sub-sample of borrowers with investment grade where arrangers also retain a 
larger fraction later on in the syndicate (Regression (6)), though only marginally significant. 
Overall, these results are in line with previous findings that certification primarily occurs for 





In this paper, we have examined the relationship between the reputation of top tier arrangers 
and the design of loan contracts and syndicate structure. Using a framework that controls for 
endogenous  matching  between  arrangers  and  borrowers,  we  show  that  syndicated  loans 
placed  by  top  tier  banks  are  characterized  by  higher  spreads  for  borrowers  than  when 
reputation  does  not  matter.  The  different  spreads  offered  by  top  tier  arrangers  that  are 
observed are largely due to the fact that top tier arrangers can self-select the best borrowers, 
leaving the rest to other arrangers.  Moreover, not only are these top tier arrangers involved in 
larger deals, but are more strongly linked with borrowers that exhibit higher credit ratings, 
which reinforce the idea that top tier arrangers can select deals of superior quality.  
 
Our findings suggest that increased loan selectivity of top tier arrangers is positively related 
to higher spreads, which differs from the evidence reported for the public bond market. This 
pattern is further supported by our finding that top tier arrangers exploit their dominance with 
borrowers that do not enjoy an investment grade rating. This suggests that borrowers with 
investment grade are not willing to pay more for taking loans from top tier banks, but other 
borrowers may well do so, possibly as a way to enhance their credit profile. At the same time, 
our results support the notion that the market for syndicated loans is different from the public 
bond  markets,  where  reputation  is  used  as  a  certification  mechanism  by  established 
underwriters as a mean to offer better pricing to clients. Indeed, we find support for the 
certification hypothesis at the syndicate structure level, if any. Since they are not simply 
intermediaries like bond underwriters, top tier arrangers can signal borrower quality not only 
from terms offered but also by holding a larger fraction of the deal. We show that after 
correcting  for  self-selection  bias  between  borrower  and  arranger,  certification  appears  to 
occur, however, only for borrowers without credit rating. This is consistent with the notion 
that borrowers that are in most need for certification and are most willing to pay for it. 
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In summary, we have been able to account for differences between the loans and syndicate 
structures  assembled  by  top  tier  arrangers  and  other  banks.  We  have  provided  explicit 
estimates about the size of the loan spreads and fees, accounting for the impact of top tier 
arrangers in obtaining superior pricing, and have shown that credit ratings account for the 
level of protective measures in syndicated loans. Finally, our study contributes to the debate 
on the importance of controlling for endogeneity and self-selection, a discussion that has 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variables  Definition 
Loan Characteristics: 
Arranger Fees  Fees obtained by arrangers; defined as the sum of upfront fee and commitment fee 
(in basis points) 
Spread  Spread of the loan in basis points above the LIBOR rate 
Loan Amount  Size of the loan tranche in US$ millions 
Lead Arranger Characteristics: 
Top Tier Bank  Dummy = 1 if at least one lead arranger is a top tier bank (as defined in Section 3) 
Borrower Characteristics: 
Borrower is Parent Company  Dummy = 1 if the borrower is the parent company (and therefore equal to 0 if the 
borrower is a subsidiary) 
Sales  Company's sales in US$ millions at date of deal closure (transformed in log) 
Previous Loan Dummy  Dummy = 1 if borrower raised previously a syndicated loan and the deal is included in 
the sample 
Size of Largest Blockholder  Fraction of outstanding shares held by the largest blockholder (equal to zero if the 
largest blockholder holds less than 5%) 
Number of Blockholders  Number of shareholders that hold at least 5% of outstanding equity 
Borrower's Rating: 
Borrower has no Rating  Dummy = 1 if the borrower has no S&P Rating Index. This proxies opaqueness of the 
borrower 
AAA_Rating  Dummy = 1 if the S&P Rating Index of the borrower's senior debt is AAA 
AA_Rating  Dummy = 1 if the S&P Rating Index of the borrower's senior debt is AA 
A_Rating  Dummy = 1 if the S&P Rating Index of the borrower's senior debt is A 
BBB_Rating  Dummy = 1 if the S&P Rating Index of the borrower's senior debt is BBB 
Lower_Rating  Dummy = 1 if the S&P Rating Index of the borrower's senior debt is not an investment 
grade (i.e., is below BBB) but has a rating 
Investment Grade Dummy  Dummy = 1 if the S&P Rating Index of the borrower's senior debt is BBB or higher 
Deal Type Dummies: 
Merger and Acquisition  Dummy = 1 if the deal purpose is to finance a merger and acquisition 
LBO / MBO  Dummy = 1 if the deal purpose is to finance an LBO / MBO 
Characteristics of Loan Syndicate: 
 
Number of Lenders in Syndicate  Number of participants in the loan syndicate, including lead arrangers 
Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead 
Arranger  
Percentage of the loan that is retained by the largest lead arranger in the syndicate 
     
 
 
   33
Table 2: League Tables of Banks for Two Different Time Periods 
This table gives the ranking of the largest banks based on the total volume of syndicated loans. Reported values are based on the 
full sample of syndicated loans available in DealScan for the period 1991-2005 (45,149 observations). For syndicated loans, an 
equal fraction 1/N of deal amount was imputed to each participant in the syndicate (where "N" stands for the syndicate size). For 
banks that merged or were acquired, the amounts and deals previously done were included in the values of the new entity or 
acquiring bank, respectively. 
  Time Period 1991-2005    Time Period 2001-2005 
Rank   Arranger  Amount (US$)   # Deals    Arranger  Amount (US$)   # Deals 
               
1  JP Morgan Chase  6,402,060,029,139  10,923    JP Morgan Chase  2,951,682,866,274  4,324 
2  Bank of America  3,392,439,423,031  11,702    Bank of America  1,830,499,745,881  5,104 
3  Citigroup  2,449,922,165,300  3,170    Citigroup  1,565,939,809,659  1,623 
4  Deutsche Bank  684,009,181,264  1,575    Wachovia Corp  408,633,868,859  1,501 
5  Wachovia Corp  573,101,120,335  2,549    Deutsche Bank  323,554,297,830  554 
6  CSFB  552,727,055,846  1,015    CSFB  278,527,243,793  506 
7  Bank of New York  242,213,573,318  928    Barclays Bank  156,360,911,496  191 
8  Barclays Bank  202,922,060,678  376    Lehman Brothers  146,558,061,917  234 
9  Wells Fargo Bank  200,403,294,039  1,551    Goldman Sachs  138,176,089,256  223 
10  Lehman Brothers  198,814,693,937  405    Wells Fargo Bank  131,748,246,019  963 
11  Goldman Sachs  198,731,303,625  304    ABN AMRO Bank  94,969,009,354  639 
12  UBS  191,794,064,090  494    Merrill Lynch  94,533,477,973  210 
13  ABN AMRO Bank  164,317,936,110  1,051    General Electric Capital  88,050,597,950  660 
14  Scotia Capital  158,202,101,253  533    BNP Paribas  82,827,446,093  293 
15  Toronto Dominion Bank  143,905,053,532  394    Bank of New York  74,789,695,777  337 
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Table 3: Evolution of Syndicated Loan Market from 1987 to 2005 
                 
Panel A: Market Shares and Bank Concentration in Syndicated Loan Market 
Reported values are based on the full sample of syndicated loans available in DealScan for the period 1991-2005 (45,149 
observations). Market shares are based on loan amounts, not number of deals done. Abbreviations: ChemB = Chemical Bank, BT = 

















Arrangers  Five Largest Arrangers (in Descending Order) 
           
1987-1990  2,433  0.148  0.406  0.552  Citigroup, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, BT, JP Morgan, ChemB 
1991  734  0.187  0.396  0.541  Citigroup, ChemB, First Chicago, JP Morgan, BT 
1992  1,060  0.184  0.400  0.545  ChemB, Citigroup, First Chicago, BT, BoA 
1993  1,359  0.212  0.467  0.587  ChemB, Citigroup, JP Morgan, BT, Chase Manhattan 
1994  2,141  0.219  0.462  0.593  ChemB, Citigroup, JP Morgan, BoA, Chase Manhattan 
1995  2,617  0.254  0.454  0.577  ChemB, Citibank, JP Morgan, Chase Manhattan, BoA 
1996  3,322  0.239  0.471  0.631  Chase Manhattan, JP Morgan, BoA, Citigroup, NationsBank 
1997  3,975  0.282  0.485  0.634  Chase Manhattan, JP Morgan, Citigroup, BoA, NationsBank 
1998  3,529  0.212  0.478  0.600  Chase Manhattan, BoA, JP Morgan, Citigroup, First Chicago 
1999  3,487  0.300  0.591  0.678  Chase Manhattan, BoA, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Bank One 
2000  3,831  0.322  0.631  0.725  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, CSFB, Bank One 
2001  3,488  0.335  0.675  0.740  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Bank One, CSFB 
2002  3,463  0.316  0.640  0.725  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Bank One, Deutsche Bank 
2003  3,634  0.248  0.580  0.680  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Bank One, Deutsche Bank 
2004  4,256  0.302  0.657  0.756  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Wachovia, CSFB 
2005  4,253  0.263  0.608  0.697  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Wachovia, Deutsche Bank 
           
1991-2005  45,149  0.360  0.688  0.758  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Wachovia 
1996-2005  37,238  0.346  0.685  0.757  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Wachovia 
2001-2005  19,094  0.312  0.672  0.749  JP Morgan Chase, BoA, Citigroup, Wachovia, Deutsche Bank 
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Panel B: Structure of Syndicated Loans 
Reported values are averages for the full sample included in the DealScan database, except for the two columns in italic 
(where the sample with tear sheets is used). For the Percentage of Deals Arranged by at Least One Top Tier Arranger, 
values are weighted by deal amount. For Percentage of Deals with Investment Grade and Percentage of Investment 
Grade Deals Arranged by Top Tier Arranger, only the sub-sample of the deals with a rating is used. 
Year (or 
Period)    
Percentage of 
Deals Arranged 
by at Least One 
Top Tier Arranger 
Percentage 





Deals Arranged by 











Loan Retained by 
Largest Arrangers 
               
1987-1990    0.561  0.540  0.195  1.140  4.540  23.678 
1991    0.541  0.513  0.189  1.128  4.184  15.213 
1992    0.515  0.516  0.238  1.097  4.499  19.034 
1993    0.596  0.529  0.268  1.059  5.157  13.698 
1994    0.625  0.572  0.344  1.056  5.795  14.317 
1995    0.643  0.578  0.370  1.055  5.968  15.712 
1996    0.669  0.473  0.341  1.068  5.830  13.195 
1997    0.637  0.400  0.280  1.030  5.504  19.102 
1998    0.623  0.352  0.259  1.086  5.100  21.526 
1999    0.619  0.418  0.312  1.054  5.908  23.431 
2000    0.643  0.514  0.413  1.142  5.867  19.055 
2001    0.616  0.591  0.434  1.237  5.756  28.915 
2002    0.610  0.574  0.393  1.357  5.682  26.588 
2003    0.571  0.497  0.328  1.208  5.849  16.858 
2004    0.608  0.396  0.287  1.368  6.131  22.336 
2005    0.615  0.380  0.289    6.039   
                       
 
 
Panel C: Major Mergers & Acquisitions of Commercial Banks in US 
  
Chase Manhattan Bank 
  - Chemical Bank (acquired in 1996) 
  
JP Morgan 
  - Chase Manhattan Bank (acquired in 2000 -- new name: JP Morgan Chase) 
  - Bank One (acquired in 2004) 
  
Wachovia Bank 
  - First Union (merged in 2001) 
  - SouthTrust (acquired in 2004) 
  
Bank of America 
  - Security Pacific National Bank (acquired in 1992) 
  - NationsBank (merged in 1998) 
  - FleetBoston (acquired in 2004) 
  
Deutsche Bank 
  - Bankers Trust (acquired in 1998) 
  
Wells Fargo Bank 
  - First Interstate Bank (acquired in 1996) 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
All the variables are defined in Table 1. For the variable "Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger", a smaller sample was used to calculate 
summary statistics, due to limited information available. In particular, 1092 observations were used for this specific variable (609 done by top tier 
arrangers and 482 not). 
Variable  Full sample 
Sub-sample of 
deals for Top Tier 
Bank = 1 
Sub-sample of 
deals  for Top Tier 
Bank = 0 
Difference 







Dev.   Mean 
 Std. 
Dev.   Mean 
 Std. 
Dev.  P-Value 
Lead Arranger Characteristics: 
Top Tier Bank (dummy)  0.563  1.000  0.541  1.000   ---  0.000   ---   --- 
Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger  24.70  13.37  26.87    19.56  22.77    31.23  30.08    0.000 
     
Borrower Characteristics: 
Borrower is Parent Company  0.878  1.000  0.327  0.859  0.349  0.902  0.297  0.001 
Sales (not transformed in log)  2709.3  784.6  7666.3  3548.2  7924.5  1648.1  7194.2  0.000 
Previous Loan Dummy  0.349  0.000  0.477  0.392  0.488  0.291  0.454  0.000 
Loan Characteristics: 
Spread (basis points)  180.6  187.5  112.8  165.0  110.4  200.4  112.8  0.000 
Loan Amount (US$ million)  417.3  200.0  757.6  538.9  942.0  277.5  440.1  0.000 
Arranger Fees  38.55  22.50  54.55  34.31  54.31  43.92  54.42  0.000 
Borrower's Rating: 
Borrower has no Rating  0.017  0.000  0.129  0.021  0.144  0.011  0.107  0.061 
AAA_Rating  0.002  0.000  0.041  0.003  0.055  0.000  0.000  0.045 
AA_Rating  0.007  0.000  0.082  0.011  0.102  0.002  0.044  0.006 
A_Rating  0.074  0.000  0.262  0.104  0.306  0.035  0.185  0.000 
BBB_Rating  0.152  0.000  0.360  0.181  0.386  0.116  0.320  0.000 
Lower_Rating  0.453  0.000  0.498  0.438  0.496  0.473  0.500  0.086 
Deal Type Dummies: 
Merger and Acquisition  0.378  0.000  0.485  0.367  0.482  0.392  0.488  0.210 
LBO / MBO  0.116  0.000  0.320  0.119  0.324  0.113  0.317  0.670 
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Table 5: Analysis on the Type of Deals Done by Top Tier Arrangers (1st Stage Regressions) 
The dependent variable in all the Probit regressions is "Top Tier Bank", a dummy variable equal to one if at least one lead arranger is a top tier bank (as defined in Section 3). The 
method of estimation is the Probit regression. All the variables are defined in Table 1. A constant term is included in all the regressions, whose coefficient is not reported. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the facility (tranche) level are used. F-statistics refer to the test that the two variables Sales and Previous Loan Dummy are jointly equal to zero. 
Significance levels: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 
Variables     (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8) 
Borrower Characteristics:                     
Sub-sample for 
Investment 
Grade = 1   
Sub-sample for 
Investment 




Borrower is Parent Company    -0.15  -0.14    -0.14  -0.004    -0.0004    0.22    -0.21    -0.21 
Loan Amount    0.0003 ***  0.0003 ***    0.0003 ***  0.0004 ***    0.0004 ***    0.0005 ***    0.0003 ***    0.0002 ** 
Sales    0.13 ***  0.12 ***    0.12 ***  0.12 **    0.12 **    0.09    0.13 ***    0.10 * 
Previous Loan Dummy    0.09  0.07    0.09  0.13    0.14    0.05    0.11    0.06 
Size of Largest Block            0.002                 
Number of Blockholders                -0.03             
                             
Borrower's Rating (Control Variables):                           
Borrower has no Rating    -0.06  -0.05    -0.06  0.07    0.06        -0.10     
Investment Grade Dummy    0.16  0.16    0.16  0.39 ***    0.37 ***             
                             
Deal Type Dummies (Control Variables):                           
Merger and Acquisition    -0.12  -0.06    -0.12  -0.01    -0.02     -0.46 **    -0.03    -0.03 
LBO / MBO    0.20  0.19    0.20  -0.14    -0.08    -0.57    0.28 *    0.29 
                             
Ln(Nasdaq Composite Index)    0.35  No    No  0.71    0.70    -0.43    0.41    -0.30 
Industry Dummies Included?    Yes  No    Yes  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Year Dummies Included?    Yes  No    Yes  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
                                            
Number of Observations    2368  2368    2368  1191     1210    556     1812     1073 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood    -1459.05  -1499.63    -1459.98  -715.80    -725.82    -256.30    -1156.49    -677.51 
Wald Chi-squared    145.35 ***  90.04 ***    142.85 ***  103.48 ***    105.80 ***    83.49 ***    86.80 ***    58.60 *** 
F-statistic (excluded instruments are jointly 0)    14.60 ***  14.31 ***    14.19 ***  7.46 **    7.14 **    1.93    12.08 ***    3.25 
Pseudo-R squared     10.20%  7.70%     10.14%  13.03%     13.11%     23.19%     7.88%     8.49% 
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Table 6: Regression Analysis on the Loan Spread (Panel A) 
The dependent variable in all the regressions is "Spread" indicated in the loan agreement, defined as the rate (in basis points) above the LIBOR rate. All the variables are defined in Table 1. The method 
of estimation is the two-step Heckman selection model estimation, expect the first specification that is estimated by OLS (for comparison purposes). The first-step regression of the Heckman's selection 
models is based on the regression specifications as shown in Table 5 (and thus depends on the specific sub-sample considered). A constant term is included in all the regressions, whose coefficient is 
not reported. Heckman's two-step standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  





   Full Sample     Full Sample    
Sub-sample 
Investment 















Deals w/ no 
Rating 
                               
Lead Arranger Characteristics:               
Top Tier Bank (dummy)   -16.42 ***        -8.09                     
LAMBDA (Inverse Mills' Ratio)      124.78 ***    124.73 ***    34.81    150.44 ***    172.34 **    89.52 ***    85.43 ** 
                               
Borrower Characteristics:               
Borrower is Parent Company   -10.57 **     -24.06 **     -24.01 **    0.22     -31.80 **     -39.50 *     -20.63 **    -3.47 
Loan Amount (million US$)   -0.02 ***    0.01 **    0.01 **    0.002    0.01    0.02    0.01 **    -0.01 
                               
Borrower's Rating (Control Variables):               
Borrower has no Rating   -42.85 ***     -47.93 ***     -47.69 ***         -51.21 ***             
AAA_Rating   -202.05 ***     -186.54 ***     -186.59 ***    -37.21             -202.55 ***     
AA_Rating   -164.36 ***     -161.45 ***     -161.51 ***     - -             -174.49 ***     
A_Rating   -147.71 ***     -135.64 ***     -135.65 ***    35.11 *             -150.04 ***     
BBB_Rating   -123.62 ***     -106.21 ***     -106.29 ***    60.79 ***             -118.33 ***     
                               
Deal Type Dummies (Control Variables):               
Merger and Acquisition   -21.80 ***     -37.87 ***     -37.99 ***     -16.64 *     -38.66 ***     -32.93 **     -31.25 ***     -41.98 *** 
LBO / MBO  43.59 ***    39.47 ***    39.41 ***    103.75 ***    40.73 ***    32.97    24.34 **    61.17 *** 
                               
Ln(Nasdaq Composite Index)  4.78    44.13    44.09    -20.83    84.33 **    22.21    15.23    114.18 * 
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Year Dummies Included?  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
                                               
Number of Observations  2368     2368     2368     556     1812     1073     1629     739 
Wald Chi-squared      678.40 ***    679.96 ***    206.43 ***    255.66 ***    128.00 ***    837.12 ***    422.79 *** 
F-Statistics  83.61 ***                             
R-squared  42%                                             39
 
Table 6: Regression Analysis on the Loan Spread (Panel B) 

















               
Lead Arranger Characteristics: 
             
LAMBDA (Inverse Mills' Ratio)  -39.05    123.78 ***    77.68 ***    146.20 *** 
               
Borrower Characteristics: 
             
Borrower is Parent Company  -28.28     -20.59 *    -13.35    -16.31 
Loan Amount (million US$)  -0.01    0.01 **    0.01    0.01 * 
               
Borrower's Rating (Control Variables): 
             
Borrower has no Rating  0.96     -47.99 ***     -43.65 ***     -39.83 *** 
AAA_Rating   - -     -183.71 ***    -128.08     -212.97 *** 
AA_Rating   -126.47 ***     -141.83 ***     -152.49 ***     -180.29 *** 
A_Rating   -109.87 **     -126.51 ***     -130.12 ***     -145.46 *** 
BBB_Rating   -100.53 ***     -99.54 ***     -85.66 ***     -140.21 *** 
               
Deal Type Dummies (Control Variables): 
             
Merger and Acquisition   -55.97 ***     -27.52 ***     -27.53 ***     -49.04 *** 
LBO / MBO  9.98    42.46 ***    41.04 **    19.14 
               
Ln(Nasdaq Composite Index)  -177.49    31.11    88.11 ***    -7.36 
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Year Dummies Included?  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
                         
Number of Observations  302     1908     1210     1158 
Wald Chi-squared  287.41 ***     7835.09 ***     481.09 ***     343.59 *** 
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Table 7: Regression Analysis on Arranger Fees 
The dependent variable in all the regressions is "Arranger Fees" indicated in the loan agreement, defined as sum of upfront fee and commitment fee. All the variables are defined in Table 1. The method of 
estimation is the two-step Heckman selection model estimation, expect the first specification that is estimated by OLS (for comparison purposes). The first-step regression of the Heckman's selection 
models is based on the regression specifications as shown in Table 5 (and thus depends on the specific sub-sample considered). Instrumental variables used in the first-step regression are "Sales" (as 
measure of firm size), "Tranched Deal (Dummy)" and "Previous Loan Dummy". A constant term is included in all the regressions, whose coefficient is not reported. Heckman's two-step standard errors are 
used. Significance levels: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  








Grade = 1 
Sub-sample 
Investment 





of Deals w/ 
Rating 
Sub-sample 
of Deals w/ 
no Rating 
Sub-sample of 
All Deals Done 
Before 1995 
Sub-sample of 
All Deals Done 
after 1995 
               
Lead Arranger Characteristics:       
Top Tier Bank (dummy)   -4.07 **             
LAMBDA (Inverse Mills' Ratio)  -16.63  9.61  -1.50  -2.22   -36.44 **  11.51  8.78  -7.22 
               
Borrower Characteristics:       
Borrower is Parent Company  -2.48  8.00 *  0.60  9.10  22.22 **  15.72 ***  -8.22  32.60 *  5.54 
Loan Amount (million US$)  -0.002  0.002  0.002 ***  0.01 **  0.01 **  0.001  0.002  0.02 **  0.001 
               
Borrower's Rating (Control Variables):       
Borrower has no Rating   -10.95 ***   -7.08 **    -6.78        -22.40   -10.20 *** 
AAA_Rating   -38.56 ***   -51.27 **  -0.51       -58.68 **     - -   -42.71 ** 
AA_Rating   -45.42 ***   -61.65 ***   - -       -69.51 ***     -95.19 ***   -31.98 ** 
A_Rating   -32.93 ***   -38.35 ***  9.26       -45.40 ***     -89.21 **   -36.33 *** 
BBB_Rating   -30.90 ***   -32.67 ***  16.22 ***       -39.82 ***     -61.13 **   -30.36 *** 
               
Deal Type Dummies (Control Variables):       
Merger and Acquisition  1.96  -0.33  3.17  -3.09  0.16  4.16  -2.22  -19.96  2.71 
LBO / MBO  5.32  10.22 **  -4.28  10.55 *  10.36  8.69  11.23  34.98 *  5.15 
               
Ln(Nasdaq Composite Index)   -24.28 ***   -31.32 **  -8.80   -46.18 **   -77.38 ***   -32.27 **  -6.36  -32.32   -27.68 ** 
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                               
Number of Observations  2368  2368  556  1812  1073  1629  739  302  1908 
Wald Chi-squared    523.23 ***  156.18 ***  318.52 ***  251.29 ***  439.62 ***  356.24 ***  253.75 ***  7621.7 *** 
F-Statistics  19.91 ***             
R-squared  16%                           41
 
Table 8: Regression Analysis on the Structure of Loan Syndicate (Panel A) 
The dependent variable is the "Number of Lenders in Syndicate" in Regressions (1) - (4), "Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger" in Regressions (5) - (8) and "Number of 
Lenders in Syndicate" times "Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger" in Regressions (9) - (16). All the variables are defined in Table 1. The method of estimation is the 
two-step Heckman selection model estimation, except Regressions (1), (5) and (9) that are estimated by OLS (for comparison purposes). The first-step regression of the 
Heckman's selection models is based on the regression specifications as shown in Table 5 (and thus depends on the specific sub-sample considered). A constant term is 
included in all the regressions, whose coefficient is not reported. Heckman's two-step standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.  
Variables  Dep. Var.: Number of Lenders in Syndicate  Dep. Var.: Fraction of Deal Retained by Lead Arranger 
 (1) -- OLS   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) -- OLS   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Lead Arranger Characteristics: 
Top Tier Bank (dummy)  2.57 ***  0.04   -5.64 ***  -1.10 
LAMBDA (Inverse Mills' Ratio)   -20.91 ***   -20.91 ***   -7.69 ***  24.12 ***  24.16 ***  11.47 ** 
% Deal Retained by Lead Arranger   -0.19 ***     
Number of Lenders in Syndicate   -1.03 *** 
Borrower Characteristics: 
Borrower is Parent Company   -1.34 *  0.53  0.53   -4.23 ***  1.89  -1.13  -1.12   -5.26 * 
Loan Amount (US$ million)  0.01 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.004 ***   -0.003 ***  0.0002  0.0002  0.004 *** 
       
Borrower's Rating (Control Variables): 
Borrower has no Rating   -3.13 ***   -2.88 **   -2.88 **   -4.33 ***  -2.88  0.59  0.66   -3.97 * 
AAA_Rating  -2.71  -7.30  -7.30  -10.19  25.46  45.39 ***  45.40 ***  26.00 * 
AA_Rating   -4.80 *   -10.60 **   -10.60 **   -7.86 ***  -1.96  14.05 *  14.06 *  3.22 
A_Rating  0.15   -4.93 **   -4.93 ***   -5.20 ***   -11.07 ***  5.75  5.77  -0.71 
BBB_Rating  1.88 ***  -1.92  -1.92   -3.85 **   -13.04 ***  2.31  2.34  -2.09 
 
Deal Type Dummies (Control Variables): 
Merger and Acquisition  0.93 *  2.09 *  2.09 *  2.36 **  -2.72   -9.67 ***   -9.70 ***  -5.44 
LBO / MBO   -1.26 *   -4.11 **   -4.11 **  1.21  -3.71   -8.31 **   -8.33 **  -1.59 
Nasdaq Composite Index   0.66  -3.14  -3.14  -2.40  -11.54  1.09  1.14  1.28 
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                          
Number of Observations  2368  2368  2368  1659  1659  1659  1659  1659 
Wald Chi-squared    256.27 ***  256.27 ***  566.50 ***    199.87 ***  200.14 ***  382.66 *** 
F-Statistics  14.28 ***        6.59 ***       
R-squared  26%           15%            42
 
 
Table 8: Regression Analysis on the Structure of Loan Syndicate (Panel B) 
Variables  Dep. Var.: Fraction Held by Largest Lead Arranger * Nbr. Lenders 





Full Sample  Full Sample 
Sub-sample 
Investment 
Grade = 1 
Sub-sample 
Investment 
Grade = 0 
Sub-sample 
of Deals w/ 
Low_Rating 
Sub-sample 
of Deals w/ 
Rating 
Sub-sample 
of Deals w/ 
no Rating 
Lead Arranger Characteristics: 
Top Tier Bank (dummy)  13.91 
LAMBDA (Inverse Mills' Ratio)  -120.93   -109.36 *   -393.03 **  13.65  -106.36   -314.21 **  30.31 
Borrower Characteristics: 
Borrower is Parent Company  -9.61  -75.81  -3.15   -189.24 **  94.22  67.39   -115.77 *  83.57 
Loan Amount (US$ million)  0.02 *  0.01  -0.01  -0.010  0.08 ***  0.03  -0.01  0.08 *** 
Size of Largest Block    0.95           
             
Borrower's Rating (Control Variables): 
Borrower has no Rating   -48.99 ***   -75.56 **  -61.17  -38.57 
AAA_Rating   -103.09 ***  -231.89   - -   - -  -340.92 
AA_Rating   -86.14 ***   -173.48 *  -82.05  148.24   -277.83 ** 
A_Rating  -17.00   -112.63 *   -151.19 **  163.97   -244.84 *** 
BBB_Rating   -67.84 ***   -164.82 ***   -168.35 ***  126.04   -272.91 *** 
 
Deal Type Dummies (Control Variables): 
Merger and Acquisition  -10.22  -0.92  -29.01  86.31  -36.77  25.88  86.70   -113.52 *** 
LBO / MBO  29.56  22.61  2.96   - -  20.99  39.97  31.80   -118.10 * 
Nasdaq Composite Index   -78.75   -225.71 *  -137.64  128.61   -347.53 **   -400.38 *  -112.94   -294.06 * 
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                          
Number of Observations  1659  1659  1339  424  1235  681  1105  554 
Wald Chi-squared    176.81 ***  148.13 ***  89.99 ***  181.23 ***  130.91 ***  152.78 ***  126.57 *** 
F-Statistics  5.33 ***               
R-squared  4.47%                      
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Table 9: Loan Spreads for Different Quartiles of Lead Arranger Retention 
The dependent variable in all the regressions is "Spread" indicated in the loan agreement, defined as the rate (in basis points) above the LIBOR rate. All 
the variables are defined in Table 1. The method of estimation is the two-step Heckman selection model estimation, except the first two regressions that 
are estimated by OLS (for comparison purposes). In regressions (1), (3), (5) and (7), we estimate the model for the sub-sample of deals with "Fraction of 
Deal Retained by Lead Arranger" smaller than the 25% percentile (equal to 8.59). The regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8) consider the sub-sample of 
"Fraction of Deal Loan Retained by Lead Arranger" larger than the 75% percentile (equal to 28.33). In regressions (5) and (6), we further limit the sub-
sample of deals with investment grade ("Investment Grade" = 1), while the regressions (7) and (8) the sub-sample of deals without investment grade 
("Investment Grade" = 0). The first-step regression of the Heckman's selection models is based on the regression specifications as shown in Table 5 (and 
thus depends on the specific sub-sample considered). A constant term is included in all the regressions, whose coefficient is not reported. Heckman's two-
step standard errors are used. Significance levels: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%. 











































Lead Arranger Characteristics:         
Top Tier Bank (dummy)   -39.61 ***   -14.25 ***             
LAMBDA (Inverse Mills' Ratio)      64.15  158.26 ***  -63.22  -39.65  109.24  174.54 *** 
                 
Borrower Characteristics:         
Borrower is Parent Company  19.32 *  -5.57  15.01   -41.98 **  -10.69  53.28 ***  -50.22   -45.96 ** 
Loan Amount (million US$)   -0.01 ***   -0.03 ***  -0.001  0.02 **  -0.004  0.00  -0.02  0.02 
                 
Borrower's Rating (Control Variables):         
Borrower has no Rating   -52.16 ***   -37.93 ***   -48.78 ***   -42.76 ***   - -   - -  -29.55   -48.38 *** 
AAA_Rating   - -   -229.96 ***   - -   -226.51 ***   - -   - -   - -   - - 
AA_Rating   -140.21 ***   -164.86 ***   -121.90 ***   -144.73 ***  -41.47  239.91 ***   - -   - - 
A_Rating   -128.34 ***   -123.95 ***   -101.23 ***   -125.11 ***  -2.10  222.04 ***   - -   - - 
BBB_Rating   -112.27 ***   -107.49 ***   -86.56 ***   -98.82 ***   - -  218.80 ***   - -   - - 
                 
Deal Type Dummies (Control Variables):         
Merger and Acquisition  -9.17   -29.13 ***  -38.14   -39.72 **  19.14   -33.56 **  -54.14   -33.56 ** 
LBO / MBO  57.00 ***  31.67 ***  25.52  39.72 **   - -  48.02  -41.92  44.79 ** 
                 
Ln(Nasdaq Composite Index)  36.78  23.28  68.96  90.97 *  43.03  -6.35  -19.74  89.66 
Industry Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies Included?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                            
Number of Observations  288  1692  267  1534  131  236  136  1298 
Wald Chi-squared      172.82 ***  311.44 ***  32.59  243.63 ***  10001 ***  176.27 *** 
F-Statistics  18.69 ***  64.31 ***             
R-squared  57%  35%                   
 